Specification: The Biggest Bottleneck in Formal Methods and Autonomy by Rozier, Kristin Yvonne
Aerospace Engineering Conference Papers,
Presentations and Posters Aerospace Engineering
11-8-2016
Specification: The Biggest Bottleneck in Formal
Methods and Autonomy
Kristin Yvonne Rozier
Iowa State University, kyrozier@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aere_conf
Part of the Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, Computer and Systems Architecture
Commons, Multi-Vehicle Systems and Air Traffic Control Commons, and the Navigation, Guidance,
Control and Dynamics Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
aere_conf/36. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Aerospace Engineering at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Aerospace Engineering Conference Papers, Presentations and Posters by an authorized administrator of Iowa State
University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Specification: The Biggest Bottleneck in Formal Methods and Autonomy
Abstract
Advancement of AI-enhanced control in autonomous systems stands on the shoulders of formal methods,
which make possible the rigorous safety analysis autonomous systems require. An aircraft cannot operate
autonomously unless it has design-time reasoning to ensure correct operation of the autopilot and runtime
reasoning to ensure system health management, or the ability to detect and respond to off-nominal situations.
Formal methods are highly dependent on the specifications over which they reason; there is no escaping the
“garbage in, garbage out” reality. Specification is difficult, unglamorous, and arguably the biggest bottleneck
facing verification and validation of aerospace, and other, autonomous systems.
This VSTTE invited talk and paper examines the outlook for the practice of formal specification, and
highlights the on-going challenges of specification, from design-time to runtime system health management.
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Abstract. Advancement of AI-enhanced control in autonomous systems
stands on the shoulders of formal methods, which make possible the rig-
orous safety analysis autonomous systems require. An aircraft cannot
operate autonomously unless it has design-time reasoning to ensure cor-
rect operation of the autopilot and runtime reasoning to ensure system
health management, or the ability to detect and respond to oﬀ-nominal
situations. Formal methods are highly dependent on the speciﬁcations
over which they reason; there is no escaping the “garbage in, garbage
out” reality. Speciﬁcation is diﬃcult, unglamorous, and arguably the
biggest bottleneck facing veriﬁcation and validation of aerospace, and
other, autonomous systems.
This VSTTE invited talk and paper examines the outlook for the
practice of formal speciﬁcation, and highlights the on-going challenges of
speciﬁcation, from design-time to runtime system health management.
We exemplify these challenges for speciﬁcations in Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) though the focus is not limited to that speciﬁcation language. We
pose challenge questions for speciﬁcation that will shape both the future
of formal methods, and our ability to more automatically verify and vali-
date autonomous systems of greater variety and scale. We call for further
research into LTL Genesis.
1 Introduction
Formal methods have now scaled to the point of enabling rigorous safety analysis
of full-scale, real-life systems, and none too soon, as such capabilities are required
for developing the autonomous systems of the future. This is because autonomy
requires systems to be reactive and concurrent [36], operating in real-time and
in an open environment. Formal methods have been recognized as a critical, and
often expected, design-time component for autonomous and life-critical systems,
such as aircraft and spacecraft. FAA standards including DO-178-B [46] DO-178-
C [48], and DO-254 [47] incorporate formal speciﬁcation, validation, and veriﬁca-
tion. For one example, NASA’s Lunar Atmosphere Dust Environment Explorer
(LADEE) mission was a resounding success. LADEE used model-based develop-
ment starting with speciﬁcation of the requirements; reﬁnement of these spec-
iﬁcations via analysis against system models; automatic generation of software
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from veriﬁed models; and a variety of veriﬁcation techniques including formal
methods, static analysis, formal inspection, and code coverage applied early and
often throughout the system design lifecycle [22]. We have inﬂuenced the design
of an automated air traﬃc control system via model checking analysis [55–57].
We have also used formal methods to help NASA assess the Functional Alloca-
tion question: in the early design stage, when there are thousands of options for
allocating essential system functions, how can we formally analyze the space of
many possible deigns to determine which are the most safe [16,37]?
In addition to design-time analysis, autonomous systems in particular crit-
ically depend on formal runtime reasoning, for runtime veriﬁcation that unan-
ticipated events do not violate their speciﬁcations, and to ensure system health
management, or the ability to detect and respond to oﬀ-nominal situations that
could not be veriﬁed at design time. NASA’s Copilot language and compiler gen-
erates runtime monitors for distributed, hard real-time systems, including pitot
tube subsystems and MAVLink (Micro Air Vehicle Link); these veriﬁed sys-
tems have ﬂown in the Edge 540 aircraft [38]. Our own Realizable, Responsive,
Unobtrusive Unit (R2U2) [18,41,49–51] utilizes formal speciﬁcations to generate
runtime observers integrated with Bayesian reasoning to provide runtime system
health management for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) such as NASA’s Swift
and DragonEye UAS.
All of these formal methods, from design time to runtime, require formal
speciﬁcations. A formal methodology, as deﬁned by Manna and Pnueli in their
seminal text on reactive and concurrent systems [36], consists of a speciﬁca-
tion language and a repertoire of proof methods by which the correctness of a
proposed system, relative to the speciﬁcation, can be formally veriﬁed. By this
deﬁnition, a formal methodology provides two components central to autonomy:
(1) the ability to make early, precise decisions, e.g. between multiple possible
designs, about major system functions; (2) the ability to remove ambiguities
from the system’s expected behavior, from design-time behavioral descriptions
to runtime behavioral monitors. For clarity through the remainder of the paper,
we will distinguish the formal speciﬁcation, or the description of the behavioral
requirement that most often appears in the form of a formula (which we will call
ϕ), from the system model that instead speciﬁes how the system works (M). The
veriﬁcation question is then the question of whether (or not) these two things
match; both are necessary inputs to a proof method.
Figure 1 shows one such example of a formal methodology. In this case, the for-
mal speciﬁcation is given as a set of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas; the
system model is a description of system operation in a formal semantics we call
M . A set of validation specifications is written simultaneously with the system
model M ; speciﬁcation debugging increases conﬁdence in the correctness of this
set, and model checking against M serves to validate M . A set of verification spec-
ifications, which ﬁrst pass speciﬁcation debugging, are model-checked against M
to verify that the early design satisﬁes its requirements. These speciﬁcations can
then be carried throughout the system development process, e.g., used for test-
case generation or simulation, and all the way to runtime veriﬁcation of the ﬁnal
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Fig. 1. A goal system design process (based on LTL model checking) where speciﬁca-
tions are ﬁrst debugged, then utilized for early system design validation, used in design
veriﬁcation, and carried through the system development process to runtime [56].
system implementation. This goal system design process, using Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) as the speciﬁcation language and model checking as a proof method
appeared in [56], where it was used successfully during the design time of a coor-
dination protocol for an automated air traﬃc control system. Formal methods,
including model checking, are highly dependent on the speciﬁcations over which
they reason; not only are speciﬁcations required for analysis, but there is no escap-
ing the “garbage in, garbage out” reality.
System
Design
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Check ERROR
M = Formal System
Model
Model
Verification
Specification
...
...
...
Fig. 2. Bottom line: inputs to formal
analysis are the biggest challenge.
Figure 2 zooms in on the inputs to
this process. The bottom line for for-
mal methods is that the inputs to for-
mal analysis are the biggest challenge. In
[56], over 100 person-hours were required
to create the inputs, which dwarfs the less
than 10 hours of total runtime required
to complete model checking analysis. In
the follow-on study of a more complex
version of the system with a large space
of possible designs, over 1000 person-
hours were required to generate the inputs
that resulted in the 1620 model-checking
instances (model-speciﬁcation-set pairs)
whose automated veriﬁcation then aver-
aged approximately 5minutes per pair
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[16]. (Validation and further analysis, e.g., using fault trees, took several hours
per pair but still far less time than speciﬁcation; total time for input genera-
tion of all automated analysis including validation, veriﬁcation, and fault tree
analysis totaled over 2000 person-hours [17].)
When it comes to formal system modeling, there is some hope in the form
of synthesis. Recall that in model checking, we check whether M |= ϕ, e.g., does
the system model satisfy its speciﬁcation? LTL Synthesis is predicated on the
fact that designing M is hard and expensive; re-designing M when M  ϕ is also
hard and expensive [52]. Starting from LTL formula ϕ synthesis designs M such
that M |= ϕ, which simpliﬁes veriﬁcation, eliminates the problem of re-designing
M , and, for algorithmic derivations, eliminates the burden of design entirely [52].
While synthesis as a technique does not yet enjoy the same level of tool support
or scalability as veriﬁcation techniques such as model checking, the ﬁeld is well
on the way to being able to greatly improve the bottleneck of the system model
as input to the formal veriﬁcation process. However, synthesis shares with model
checking the requirement of a formal speciﬁcation: the input formula ϕ. So, while
synthesis is a worthwhile goal with the potential to eventually solve half of the
inputs bottleneck, what we really need is LTL Genesis!
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 asks where we
will get speciﬁcations from, while Sect. 3 examines how we will examine their
quality. Section 4 asks how do we best use speciﬁcations, including introduc-
ing new ideas for speciﬁcation patterns. Section 5 asks how should we organize
speciﬁcations to enable these uses and examines the merits of strategies for
accomplishing this. Section 6 concludes and gives an outlook for a future of well-
speciﬁed autonomous systems.
2 Specification Origins
Speciﬁcations are required for all applications of formal methods, yet extracting
speciﬁcations for real-life safety critical systems often proves to be a huge bottle-
neck or even an insurmountable hurdle to the application of formal methods in
practice. This is the state for safety-critical systems today and as these systems
grow more complex, more pervasive, and more powerful in the future, there is
not a clear path even for maintaining the bleak status quo [3,4].
At NASA in particular, extracting speciﬁcations needed for any formal analy-
sis is a huge challenge [4,5,16,37,55,56]. Some critical systems are designed
without ever having what this community would consider to be a formal set
of requirements. Some design processes don’t formally deﬁne requirements until
the testing phase, far too late to use them for design or design-time analysis,
or other key periods in the system development life-cycle where formal methods
are applicable. Even for critical systems where speciﬁcations are deﬁned early
in the system development life-cycle, they often mix many diﬀerent objectives,
mixing many diﬀerent levels of detail and describing things like how the system
is deﬁned, how the system should behave, legal-speak on why the system satisﬁes
rules, and more – sometimes all in the same sentence! As safety-critical systems
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Fig. 3. An illustration of the outdated V Systems Engineering Model from [27].
become increasingly complex and the budgetary and other constraints tighten,
where can we look in the future to hope to extract the speciﬁcations we need for
formal analysis?
Even outside of the formal methods community, systems engineering
processes are adapting to the fact that the old standard V model of systems
engineering (shown in Fig. 3) is outdated and does not capture the steps neces-
sary for the design of today’s complex, possibly autonomous, systems [27]. This
realization comes from the need to deﬁne, and debug, requirements ﬁrst, modify
them throughout the system design lifecycle with each new phase of develop-
ment, and perform veriﬁcation at every stage of system design, not just at the
end. AFRL has documented the unreasonable cost associated with the V model
[21,25,26]. While an estimated 70% of faults are introduced in the early design
phases on the left of the V, all but 3.5% are found in the later stages of system
integration and testing (on the right of the V), where they are increasingly costly
to ﬁx. The estimated nominal cost for fault removal is 300-1000x for faults found
in the ﬁnal “Acceptance” or “Operation” phase versus the early design phases
[25,26]. The emerging realization that we need to deﬁne precise speciﬁcations
that can be automatically analyzed from the earliest stages of system design has
given rise to many diﬀerent methods for deriving speciﬁcations, e.g., in LTL.
Though none of these have emerged as industrial standards, several spec-
iﬁcation extraction strategies remain under study as active areas for further
research.
Human Authorship: Train system designers to write formal speciﬁcations ﬁrst
and have them author their own LTL, or pair designers with formal methods
team to write speciﬁcations.
– Advantages include potential for accuracy and improved design-level reason-
ing; disadvantages include high learning curves and lack of automation.
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Natural Language Processing (NLP): Extract formal speciﬁcations from
English Operational Concepts, encoding them in LTL for automated analysis.
Notable tools include ARSENAL [20] and VARED [5]. NLP is highly input-
dependent: it is diﬃcult to handle unstated assumptions, implied/arbitrary func-
tions, slang, mixed abstraction levels, and other inconsistencies. There is a ques-
tion whether structured English is advantageous over natural language.
– Advantages include the high level of automation and low learning curve
required; disadvantages include that is it hard to measure correctness, com-
pleteness, and closeness to the designers intentions.
Specification Mining: Extract behaviors from existing systems. Can combine
with test-case generation to explore system behavior [13].
– Advantages include automation; disadvantages include the need for a code
speciﬁcation as input.
Static Analysis: Map all paths of a program.
– Advantages include automation; disadvantages include that it is hard to dif-
ferentiate normal usage from exceptions; also some essential speciﬁcations, like
function postconditions, can be diﬃcult to extract [54].
Learning/Dynamic Invariants: Analyze actual executions; observe use-cases.
– Advantages include that checking observed variable values against a library
of ﬁxed invariant patterns can automatically generate valuable speciﬁcations.
Disadvantages include that speciﬁcations might refer to internal details or be
irrelevant; observations are too limited and are heavily dependent on the set
of observed executions [54].
Specification Wizard: Semi-automated exploration of system facets, guided
by human input.
– Disadvantages include that similar ideas similar were tried previously and
failed to catch on widely; advantages include that today’s complex autonomous
systems demand a more standardized system design process that may provide
a better platform to build upon. With the widespread use of COTS compo-
nents that could be added to an online database and the recent advances in
speciﬁcation extraction from LTL patterns and component parameters, there
is a new opportunity for a wizard.
Notably, Zeller asked: can we have speciﬁcations for free [54]? Can we combine
speciﬁcation mining, test-case generation, static analysis, and dynamic invariants
to extract speciﬁcations automatically? The speciﬁcations would be automati-
cally mined from code, so that speciﬁcation validation would equate to software
defect detection. While this is a promising strategy for software runtime veriﬁ-
cation, fundamentally this process still requires code as an input. (In a sense,
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the code is now the speciﬁcation; so we have not solved the speciﬁcation genesis
problem.) This strategy does not solve the speciﬁcation problem for early design
time, where code has not yet been written, or for cyber-physical systems that
combine code with other components. The problem of requiring input code can
be mitigated by using speciﬁcations extracted from the last version of a system
for creating new designs. However, there remain challenges with specialization
of the previous code, levels of abstraction, and relevance to the new system.
Other challenges include scalability, eﬃciency, and expressiveness of extracting
speciﬁcations for free. Still, Zeller’s idea is highly intriguing!
3 Specification Quality
How can we know when we’re “done” extracting speciﬁcations or have some idea
of how well we’ve done? As critical systems continue to grow in complexity, how
will we measure the completeness, coverage, or general quality of a speciﬁcation
or a set of speciﬁcations? We asked these questions in a panel at NFM2014 [4],
yet in large degree they remain open areas for future research.
The emerging area of specification debugging [24,30], also called sanity check-
ing, has made notable progress in automated analysis of speciﬁcation quality,
chieﬂy in four areas. We brieﬂy discuss each, with respect to LTL speciﬁcations
speciﬁcally.
Satisfiability. For LTL, satisﬁability checking reduces to model checking against
a universal model, or a model that accepts all possible valuations of the variables
at all states [43]. Formally, if we let ϕ be a speciﬁcation over the set Prop
of propositions then a system model M is universal if it contains all possible
traces over Prop: Lω(M) = (2Prop)ω. A model checker negates ϕ and checks
for emptiness of the combined model for ¬ϕ and M . Then ϕ is satisﬁable by
any counterexample returned by model checking against M : M  ¬ϕ iﬀ ϕ is
satisﬁable. If there is no counterexample, then ϕ is not satisﬁable. In [43,44]
we advocate for a sanity check of checking ϕ, ¬ϕ, and the conjunction of all
speciﬁcations describing the same system for satisﬁability before using them in
system design and veriﬁcation.
Stated another way, let ϕ describe a “good” requirement that the system
must uphold. Then ¬ϕ describes a “bad” behavior that the system must never
display. The model checker takes as input ϕ, then negates it, combines it with
the input model, and checks if the resulting combined automaton is empty,
outputting a counterexample if not. Model checking ϕ against a universal model
will show whether or not ¬ϕ is satisﬁable. A counterexample returned by the
model checker in this case is a satisfying assignment to the formula. If ¬ϕ is not
satisﬁable, then the model checking search of its combination with the universal
model will not return a counterexample because no satisfying assignment exists.
The reverse situation is also a problem. If ϕ is not satisﬁable, then ¬ϕ is a
tautology. So, in a normal model checking run, we would model check ¬ϕ against
a system model, the model checker would negate ϕ to get ¬ϕ, and return a
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counterexample, which we are expecting to indicate that there is something
wrong with the system model. However, since ¬φ is a tautology, no matter how
we change the system model, we will always get some counterexample.
In [44], we conducted an extensive experimental evaluation of LTL satisﬁa-
bility checking via model checking, concluding that using symbolic model check-
ing for this task is vastly superior to explicit-state model checking in terms of
both correctness and performance. (Symbolic tools always returned the correct
SAT/UNSAT result; this was not true for any of the explicit tools available at the
time, perhaps due to the diﬃculty of implementing their algorithms.) In [45] we
designed a portfolio approach consisting of 30 new encodings for LTL satisﬁabil-
ity via symbolic model checking that performed up to exponentially faster than
was previously possible. In [33,34], the explicit approach was improved, circum-
venting explicit-state model checking and solving the LTL satisﬁability problem
directly using techniques borrowed from propositional SAT solving. Today, the
(freely available) tools PANDA [45] and Aalta [34], represent the state of the
art in symbolic (via the nuXmv model checker) and explicit LTL satisﬁability
checking, respectively.
Vacuity. Sanity checks in industry include many types of simple, often ad hoc,
tests such as checking for duplicate conﬂicting variable assignments or enabling
conditions that are never enabled [32]. Vacuity checking can help detect errors in
speciﬁcations by checking whether a subformula of a speciﬁcation does not aﬀect
the satisfaction of the speciﬁcation in the system model [31]. A common exam-
ple is checking for implications like (p → ♦q) where p can never be enabled.
Inherent vacuity checking is a set of sanity checks that can be applied to a set
of temporal properties, even before a model of the system has been developed,
but many possible errors cannot be detected by inherent vacuity checking [15].
This capability is available in some proprietary industrial tools [7], and VaqUoT
provides a front-end checker for nuXmv, but it only handles the subset of LTL
that can be encoded as CTL [19]. VARED [5] integrates an updated algorithm
for vacuity checking [23] into an end-to-end toolchain for requirements analysis.
Realizability. Realizability checking provides another, stronger sanity check for
a set of temporal properties in LTL by testing whether there is an open system
that satisﬁes all the properties in the set [40], but such a test is very com-
putationally expensive: 2ExpTime-Complete. However, notable progress on the
problem is underway. RATSY [8] checks realizability of the class of Generalized
Reactivity(1) (GR(1) [39]) speciﬁcations via an interactive game with the speci-
ﬁer. Acacia+ [9] also solves LTL realizability problems encoded as safety games.
Another approach to realizability checking [35] builds upon RATSY using a
template-based speciﬁcation mining approach to identify situations of an under-
constrained environment or an over-constrained system. This approach is com-
plimented by work on detecting unrealizability due to overly-strong system guar-
antees or overly restricted signals [29]. An algorithm for ﬁnding minimal cores
of unrealizability of GR(1) speciﬁcations is implemented in nuXmv [12]. All
of these address the tricky space of checking speciﬁcations that are satisﬁable
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but unrealizable because there is no implementation that can produce outputs
that satisfy the speciﬁcation given all possible inputs that can be generated by
the environment. Realizability is inherently tied to synthesis: the LTL synthesis
problem seeks to produce a model such that ϕ is realizable.
Coverage. Coverage is a complicated sanity check because signiﬁcant research
has been contributed just to a set of deﬁnitions; measuring coverage for each such
deﬁnition is a separate research question. Informally, coverage asks whether a set
of LTL speciﬁcations considers all of the behaviors of the system; behaviors may
be deﬁned in various ways with respect to states or paths through an execution
graph/automaton required for a speciﬁcation to pass, the set of system variables,
model checking analysis, checks for incomplete or redundant sub-models, etc. In
a sense, coverage is complimentary to vacuity checking in that it asks whether
there are parts of the system that are not relevant for the veriﬁcation process
to proceed. Coverage checking for LTL can be integrated into model checking
[11]. Algorithms for automatically checking LTL coverage and completeness have
been successfully used in industry for sanity checking, e.g., the requirements for
an airplane control system [6].
4 Specification Usage
How should formal speciﬁcations (both those we are given and those we must
extract) ﬁt into the design life-cycle for diﬀerent kinds of critical systems? How
can we indoctrinate formal speciﬁcations into diverse teams of system designers
without hitting barriers to adoption such as huge costs in terms of time and
learning curves? What should our roadmap look like for a future full of well-
speciﬁed (formally analyzable) critical systems?
Figure 4 shows the updated waterfall model for system design that has sup-
planted the former V model of Fig. 3. The need to deﬁne speciﬁcations early and
carry them through all stages of system design has given rise to many diﬀerent
speciﬁcation use strategies. All present interesting challenges for future research.
Property-Based Design: system design centers around speciﬁcations
– Challenge: deﬁning a foundation of speciﬁcations early
Synthesis: generate M such that M |= ϕ
– Challenge: how can we synthesize a cyber-physical system M?
Specification-Based Testing: use speciﬁcations in test-case generation
– Challenge: how can we carry speciﬁcations through diﬀerent levels of abstrac-
tion?
From Design- to Run-Time: carry speciﬁcations through the design cycle
– Challenge: how do we deﬁne a speciﬁcation design lifecycle?
Maintenance: using speciﬁcations in system up-keep
– Challenge: what do best practices for maintenance of speciﬁcations look like?
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Fig. 4. The current waterfall model for system engineering incorporates the speciﬁca-
tions (aka system requirements) throughout all phases of system design.
4.1 Specification Patterns
Since the early days of temporal logic speciﬁcations, we have been concerned
with dividing them into classes like Safety/Liveness/Guarantee/Obligation,
Fairness/Justice/Compassion, or Safety/Response/Reactivity [36]. While these
classes have proven useful in specializing algorithms for automated analysis, they
are still too coarse and tied to syntax for practical use; there is a need for more
functional and hierarchical speciﬁcation.
Dwyer et al. [14] answered with deﬁnitions of speciﬁcation formula patterns
that have many practically useful properties. Formula patterns are organized in
a hierarchy based on semantics and leverage experience with design and coding
patterns to enable system designers to more eﬃciently generate speciﬁcations.
This specification pattern system captures recurring solutions and allows speci-
ﬁers to generalize across domain-speciﬁc problems. It encourages re-use by better
enabling practitioners to identify the same patterns across systems and makes
transparent the means by which requirements are satisﬁed.
Formula patterns each have a name, intent, logic (language), scope (time
interval), and relationship to other patterns. Each pattern is characterized by
the following traits:
– Solves a Speciﬁc Problem, e.g. not too abstract
– Proven Concept eﬀective in practice
– Not Obvious or direct application of basic principles
– Describes Relationships, not single components
– Generative, describes how to construct a solution
However, challenges remain with the translational semantics of these formula
patterns: they are not compositional and are often inconsistent with the seman-
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tics of informal deﬁnitions. Therefore, [10] introduced automata-based patterns.
These are:
– Compositional: based on compositions of patterns (logic executions) and
scopes (time)
– Homogeneous: don’t ﬂatten key patterns/scopes separation
– Extensible: compositional semantics allow adding patterns & scopes
– Generic: can combine any pattern and any scope
– Faithful: formal guarantee that the translated temporal formula is faithful to
the intended natural semantics
While automata-based patterns correct some inconsistencies in the previous
formula patterns, they present other challenges: it is often more natural for
practitioners to think of speciﬁcations in terms of time lines (temporal logic) than
automata, and automata patterns pose a challenge for many of the sanity checks
from Sect. 3. Design-time formula patterns and automata patterns still do not
answer the pressing question: what about runtime specifications for autonomous
systems?
4.2 R2U2: Runtime Specification Patterns in the Field
Work on speciﬁcation patterns focuses mostly on design time, which is impactful
for applications such as model checking. But in today’s complex, cyber-physical,
and/or autonomous systems, exhaustive veriﬁcation is not achievable for all sub-
systems; in practice, more speciﬁcations are used for applications such as runtime
veriﬁcation. Formula patterns are not compositional, which can be a challenge
for runtime evaluation. Automata patterns are not decomposable and are more
complex to sanity check, e.g., because it is easier to check satisﬁability and real-
izability on a formula than an automaton. Yet it is vital to sanity check runtime
speciﬁcations.
Therefore, we ask the question: what about functional patterns?1 Are there
diﬀerent patterns for speciﬁcation functions, e.g., between design time and run-
time? In our experience with runtime veriﬁcation in the ﬁeld [18,41,49–51], we
have observed the following ﬁve functional patterns.
Ranges. Sensors have well-deﬁned operating ranges: both ranges of the values
they can report and ranges of operation. For example, a laser altimeter has a
ceiling; above this altitude its readings should not be trusted. For each sensor,
we check its operating ranges and the bounds on correct values it can return.
Rates. For each sensor stream on a system, there are rate constraints. We must
check that value changes fall within realistic bounds, both for the sensitivity
and tolerances of the individual sensor and for the physics of the system. For
example, if a sensor indicates that an aircraft is falling faster than gravity, clearly
there is something wrong with that sensor!
1 Note that the term functional patterns has been used in a diﬀerent context: describ-
ing Requirements Speciﬁcation Language (RSL) patterns for system state changes
in response to external stimuli [2].
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Relationships. There are predictable relationships between multiple sensors; we
need to compare temporal outputs from related or redundant sensors for correct-
ness. For example, the readings from all three altimeters should be consistent,
modulo sensor noise. Pitching up and increasing power to the engines should
result in a rise in altitude shortly afterward.
Control Sequences. A sequence of events will predictably happen following a
command to take oﬀ, land, or carry out a procedure like a waypoint visit, with
check-able milestones along the way A command to take oﬀ requires an ordered
set of actions such as turning on the engines, taxiing, increasing altitude above
ground level, and reaching a prescribed altitude. A command to land involves
a series of actions in a precise order, such as an initial decrease in altitude,
deploying of landing gear, and approaching the appropriate runway.
Consistency Checks. Do all components have the same view of system
state/environment? We consider both intra- and inter-component properties.
For example, the rate of noise from a sensor should not suddenly increase. The
ﬂight computer and autopilot should always agree on which waypoint the UAS
is currently visiting.
In industrial systems, LTL is often not the exclusive speciﬁcation language.
While languages and constructs for speciﬁcation vary widely and are often tailored
to speciﬁc applications, one general trend is the propensity for expanding upon
LTL or combining it with other speciﬁcation constructs. An example of this is the
speciﬁcation format we use for R2U2, the Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive
Unit for runtime system health management. Figure 5 summarizes R2U2 speci-
ﬁcations, which combine two encodings for each linear-time temporal logic for-
mula, which may be in one of several variants of LTL, with eﬃcient (non-dynamic)
Bayes Nets to provide diagnostic decision-making capabilities. Speciﬁcations ana-
lyzed via R2U2 are exclusively checked during runtime and do not follow previ-
ously deﬁned patterns for formulas or automata because those describe design-
time speciﬁcations consisting exclusively of temporal logic formulas.
R2U2 specification format:
1. TL Observers: Efficient temporal reasoning
(a) Asynchronous: output 〈t, {0, 1}〉
(b) Synchronous: output 〈t, {0, 1, ?}〉
– Logics: MTL, pt-MTL, Mission-time LTL
– Variables: Booleans (from system bus), sensor filter outputs
2. Bayes Nets: Efficient decision making
– Variables: outputs of TL observers, sensor filters, Booleans
– Output: most-likely status + probability
Fig. 5. R2U2 system health management framework in a nutshell [41,50].
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We need to expand speciﬁcation patterns to runtime! How do we expand
patterns to reason about speciﬁcations in the ﬁeld?
Health Nodes / Failure Modes
H FG Magnetometer sensor
H FC RxUR Receiver underrun
H FC RxOVR Receiver overrun
H FG TxOVR Transmitter overrun in sensor
H FG TxErr Transmitter error in in sensor
H_FG
S4 S5
H_FG_TxErr
S2
H_FG_TxOVR
S1S3
H_FC_RxOVR
S6
H_FC_RxUR
Fig. 6. The possible failures a Fluxgate Magnetometer can suﬀer can be diagnosed by
a Bayes Net with a health node corresponding to each type of failure. These nodes take
as input the valuations from six temporal logic runtime observers; many failures require
inputs from multiple temporal observers in order to make an accurate diagnosis [18].
As an example, Fig. 6 displays a pictorial representation of a set of speciﬁca-
tions for determining if a fault has occurred in the ﬂuxgate magnetometer during
runtime. From the manual, we know that there are ﬁve possible faults that can
occur. We can write six temporal logic speciﬁcations that we encode as run-
time observers outputting statuses S1, . . . , S6. The outputs from these runtime
observers are inputs to ﬁve Bayesian health nodes, one for determining whether
it is probabilistically likely that each possible fault has occurred. A health node
may hierarchically depend on the output from more than one runtime sensor
node and the runtime observers may supply temporal information to multiple
health nodes.
Cyber-physical, autonomous systems often utilize hierarchical, multi-
formalism speciﬁcations; see, e.g., [53]. In R2U2, we combine speciﬁcations in
a way that is hierarchically structured, compositional, and cross-language. How
do we organize R2U2 specifications?
5 Specification Organization
How should we organize speciﬁcations? How do we store speciﬁcations in an
accessible way that allows for automated analysis including veriﬁcation? How
do we best enable re-use from design time to runtime to the design of future
systems? How do we pair English and formal speciﬁcations in an understand-
able way? How do we preserve the hierarchical structure, compositionality, and
relationships between speciﬁcations in our practical, organizational structure?
Can we do all of this in a performable way?
Speciﬁcation: The Biggest Bottleneck in Formal Methods and Autonomy 21
Scenario deﬁnition languages such as the Aviation Scenario Deﬁnition Lan-
guage (ASDL) [28] establish structured speciﬁcation standards over domain-
speciﬁc vocabulary for veriﬁcation, execution, simulation, sharing, comparing,
and re-using scenario speciﬁcations. This approach provides transparency to
system designers via model-to-text translation, and graphical modeling envi-
ronments. ASDL is an Eclipse modeling framework suited to deﬁning scenario
models for simulation, but we still need an eﬃcient way to store and codify spec-
iﬁcations. Most signiﬁcantly, there is the question of M vs ϕ: how do we distin-
guish functions of the system model from design- and runtime speciﬁcations so
that we can analyze speciﬁcations automatically and use them throughout the
system lifecycle?
One can turn to an all-in-one tool suite such as Matlab/Simulink, but since
these tools were not designed for speciﬁcation organization, this solution tends
to be kludgy and not scalable. Considering the often long life of speciﬁcations,
which follow a system throughout its entire lifecycle, the lack of backwards-
compatibility in successive tool versions presents a signiﬁcant negative.
SQL databases are routinely used for longterm, scalable information storage.
However, the relationships between speciﬁcations are inherently non-tabular;
ﬁtting them into this schema requires ﬂattening the database, and accessing
them requires extensive JOINs, making this solution non-performable.
None of these strategies solve the organization problem. We have hit an era
of Big Data of Specifications. If we follow recommended practices for system
design, then speciﬁcations are everywhere! So, how do we organize speciﬁcations
for each subsystem, subcomponent, and level of abstraction? How do we mine
speciﬁcations for data, patterns, statistical analysis, and coverage? How do we
search speciﬁcations? How do we sort speciﬁcations? How do we integrate speciﬁ-
cation languages for diﬀerent purposes? How do we make speciﬁcations available
for reuse?
5.1 A Property Graph Database Approach to Specification
Organization with Neo4j
We can represent R2U2 speciﬁcations using a property graph.
Definition 1. [42] A property graph G = (V,E, λ, μ) is a directed, edge-labeled,
attributed multi-graph where V is a set of nodes, E is a multiset of directed edges,
λ : E → Σ is an edge labeling function assigning a label from the alphabet Σ to
each edge, and μ : (V ∪ E) × K → S is a property assignment function over the
sets K of property keys and S of property values.
Organizing big data requires a database that can store and enable eﬃcient
access to large speciﬁcation sets, so we use a property graph database. Neo4j2 is
a publicly available, performable, NoSQL graph database implemented in Java
and Scala that eﬃciently implements the property graph model to allow, e.g.,
2 https://neo4j.com.
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constant-time traversals for relationships in the graph. A property graph data-
base stores Nodes (graph data records), and Relationships (directional connect
nodes), with Properties (named data values of type string, number, Boolean, or
array), on both Nodes and Relationships.
name: S4
LTL: <formula> MTL: <formula>
name: S5
LTL: <formula>
name: S6 name: S3
MTL: <formula> LTL: <formula>
2S :eman1S :eman
MTL: <formula>
name: H_FG
CPT: <array of floats>
name: H_FC_rxUR
CPT: <array of floats>
name: H_FC_RxOVR
CPT: <array of floats> CPT: <array of floats>
name: H_FG_TxErrname: H_FG_TxOVR
CPT: <array of floats>
Relationship: takes as input
Property: variable name
Properties: name, conditional probability table
Node: Bayes Net health node
Node: Temporal Logic Observer
Properties: name, LTL/MTL/pt−MTL formula
Node: Boolean filter
Properties: name, filter
Node: Sensor signal
Properties: name, origin
Hdy FGx FGyHdx
< 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 Ntot
Nb
>=1= 0
... ... ...
Fig. 7. A property graph database storage scheme for the Fluxgate Magnetometer
failure speciﬁcations of Fig. 6 with additional details from the case study in [18].
Figure 7 re-draws Fig. 6 with the Neo4j database schema we are currently
investigating for R2U2 speciﬁcations. We have four types of Nodes: Bayes
Net health nodes that contain conditional probability tables, Temporal Logic
Observer nodes that store logic formulas, Boolean ﬁlter nodes that ﬁlter direct
sensor signals, and Sensor signal nodes that designate which system signals we
are reasoning about. All relationships pictured are of type “takes as input”
and are labeled with the name of the variable whose value is set by the given
input. Note that nodes can mix properties, so we can deﬁne our Temporal Logic
Observer nodes to have one type of formula, either LTL, MTL, or pt-MTL.
6 Conclusions and Outlook
Going forward, as a community, we need to continuously re-assess our answer to
the question “Where are we now?” with regards to speciﬁcations. For the fore-
seeable future, speciﬁcations remain arguably the biggest bottleneck in formal
methods and autonomy. While there are several promising research thrusts in
speciﬁcation debugging, updated system design processes that encourage speci-
ﬁcation extraction, and speciﬁcation patterns, we still do not have a clear path
forward, particularly in the context of cyber-physical, autonomous systems. The
questions posed by this paper of where we will get speciﬁcations from, how
should we measure their quality, how should we best use them, and how should
we organize them, continue to drive future research directions.
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In future work, we plan to devise formal deﬁnitions of the functional speciﬁ-
cation patterns introduced here. There are many experimental evaluations in the
pipeline, including use of functional speciﬁcation patterns and technical analysis
and performance evaluation of a new Neo4j speciﬁcation organization scheme
for R2U2 speciﬁcations. We also plan to advance capabilities for speciﬁcation
debugging, particularly satisﬁability checking, and methods for eﬃciently rea-
soning about speciﬁcations in new logics now appearing in industrial settings,
such as MTL [1].
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